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Abstract Standard possible world semantics for propositional modal lan-guages ignore 
truth-value gaps. However, simple considerations suggest that it should not be so. In Section 
1, I identify what I take to be a correct truth-clause for necessity under the assumption that 
some possible worlds are incomplete (i.e., “at” which some propositions lack a truth-
value). In Section 2, I build a world semantics, the semantics of TV-models, for standard 
modal propositional languages, which agrees with the truth-clause for necessity previously 
identi-fied. Sections 3–5 are devoted to systematic concerns. In particular, in Section 4, 
Prior’s system Q (propositional version) is given a TV-models semantics and proved 
adequate (i.e., sound and complete) with respect to it.
1 Incomplete worlds and modality Let a proposition be any statement that is ac-
tually true or false,1 and let us say that possible world w is (i) complete with respect
to proposition p if and only if p is true or false at w, and (ii) complete (tout court)
if and only if it is complete with respect to all propositions. Then by definition the
actual world is complete. And a classical assumption in possible worlds semantics
for propositional modal logics is that every possible world is complete.
There are serious reasons to reject that assumption. Consider, for instance, the
proposition ‘Socrates is mortal’, and assume (i) that there are possible worlds where
Socrates does not exist, and (ii) that for ‘Socrates is mortal’ to have a truth-value at a
world, Socrates must exist therein: two defendable assumptions, which jointly entail
that there are worlds where ‘Socrates is mortal’ has no truth-value.
Once it is granted that some propositions have no truth-value at some worlds, it
is still not decided if and how these truth-value gaps are transmitted to more complex
propositions. In this paper, we shall adopt the principle of contamination, according
to which if a proposition has no truth-value at a given world, then every proposition
containing the first thereby has no truth-value at that world.
1Published in Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 40, issue 20, 236-249, 1999
which should be used for any reference to this work
Now, the admission of incomplete worlds, together with the acceptance of the
principle of contamination, raises some difficulties when it comes to stating truth-
clauses for necessity operators. Consider first the usual clause:
(1) A is true iff A is true at every possible world.
Now, let w be a possible world, incomplete with respect to some proposition A. Then,
by the principle of contamination, w is also incomplete with respect to A∨ ∼A. And
since, of course, being true at a world entails having a truth-value at that world, a
consequence of (1) is that A∨ ∼A is not necessarily true: an unhappy result.
The classical modal logician has a ready-made solution to this problem. It con-
sists in adopting the spirit, not the letter, of the classical truth-clause for the box:
(2) A is true iff A is true at every complete world.
The problem with this proposal is that, as far as I can see, there is no good reason
to accept the restriction to complete worlds. For consider some proposition A. Then
intuitively, if A is necessarily true, then A is true at every world where it has a truth-
value—and not only at every complete world. And conversely, if A is true at every
world where it has a truth-value, then, plausibly, A is necessarily true. (Note here that
if A is true at every world where it has a truth-value, it is true at every complete world,
and so by the classical clause, it is necessarily true.) That is, intuitively the following
biconditional holds:
(3) A is true iff A is true at every possible world where it has a truth-value.
Let us now turn to possibility. Defining possibility in terms of necessity by the usual
‘=∼∼’, the following truth-clauses can be derived from (1), (2), and (3) respec-
tively:
(1′) A is true iff there is a possible world at which A is not false;
(2′) A is true iff there is a complete possible world at which A is true;
(3′) A is true iff there is a possible world at which A is true.
(The derivations make use of the basic truth-condition for ∼ , the fact that being true
at a world entails having a truth-value at that world, and the principle that having a
truth-value at world w and not being true at w entails being false at w.) Condition (1′)
is subject to the same type of problem as (1). For let w be a possible world, incomplete
with respect to some proposition A. Then, by the principle of contamination, w is also
incomplete with respect to A & ∼A. And once again, since being false at a world
entails having a truth-value at that world, a consequence of (1′) is that (A & ∼A)
is true—an undesirable result. On the other hand, condition (2′), just like condition
(2), seems ill-motivated. As to condition (3′), it sounds perfectly right.
Clause (3) is radically different from any usual truth-clause for the box. The dif-
ference is essentially this. Let WA be the set of all possible worlds at which propo-
sition A must be true for A to be true. According to any classical truth-clause for
necessity, WA = WB for any two distinct propositions A and B: WA and WB are in
both cases the set of all possible worlds (accessible from the actual world). On the
other hand, according to condition (3), it may be the case that WA = WB; it is actu-
ally so as soon as there is some world at which only one of A or B has a truth-value.
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In Section 2 below, I build a simple world semantics for standard languages con-
taining a necessity operator which agrees on necessity with condition (3). Systematic
matters and adequacy results are dealt with in Sections 3–5.
2 Modeling necessity Let L be a formal language, whose vocabulary consists in (i)
a denumerable set of propositional letters (the atoms), and (ii) the operators ∼ (nega-
tion), & (conjunction), and  (necessity). What counts as a formula of L is charac-
terized in the usual way, and operators ∨ (disjunction), ⊃ (material implication), ≡
(material equivalence), and  (possibility) are standardly defined.
There are many ways one can provide L with a world semantics which agrees
with condition (3) of Section 1. However, the most straightforward way to model L
is by means of what I shall call TV-models. TV-models are essentially S5-models
without accessibility relation, modified so as to take into account the possibility
of truth-value gaps. More precisely, a TV-model for language L is a quadruple
〈@,W ,TV, |=〉, where W is a set, @ is in W , and TV and |= are two-place rela-
tions between worlds and atoms, meeting conditions:
[TV-@] for every atom p, TV(@, p), and
[|=-TV] for every w in W and every atom p, if w |= p then TV(w, p).
Under the intended interpretation, W is the set of all possible worlds, @ is the actual
world, ‘TV(w, p)’ is read ‘p has a truth-value at w’, and ‘w |= p’ is read ‘ p is true at
w’. The first condition amounts to the claim that the atoms of L stand for propositions
in the sense introduced at the beginning of Section 1 and the second condition speaks
for itself.
Given an arbitrary TV-model 〈@,W ,TV,|=〉, we must specify how TV and |=
extend to relations between worlds and complex formulas. The conditions on truth-
valuedness I choose are
[TV. ∼] TV(w,∼A) iff TV(w, A),
[TV. & ] TV(w, A & B) iff TV(w, A) and TV(w, B), and
[TV.] TV(w,A) iff TV(w, A).
The idea behind these three conditions is that (i) a complex formula has no truth-value
at a world if some of its subformulas have no truth-value at that world, and (ii) a com-
plex formula has a truth-value at a world if its subformulas all have a truth-value at
that world. (i) is motivated by the principle of contamination and (ii) seems reason-
able.
The clauses for |= are
[|= . ∼] w |= ∼A iff TV(w, A) and w |= A,
[|= . & ] w |= A & B iff w |= A and w |= B,
[|= .] w |= A iff TV(w, A) and for every v in W such that
TV(v, A), v |= A.
For an arbitrary TV-model we then have
@ |=∼A iff @ |= A;
@ |= A & B iff @ |= A and @ |= B;
@ |= A iff for every w in W such that TV(w, A),w |= A.
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The clauses for ∼ and & are standard and the condition for  is as foreshadowed.
We also have, for every world w and every formula A,
1. TV(@, A);
2. if w |= A then TV(w, A);
3. TV(w, A) iff w |= A or w |=∼A;
4. w |= A iff TV(w, A) and for some v in W , v |= A;
5. @ |= A iff for some v in W , v |= A.
Let us turn finally to validity. Formula A will be said to be valid in TV-model M if
and only if for every world w of M at which A has a truth-value, A is true at w. And
formula A will be said to be valid if and only if A is valid in every TV-model.
As one can easily check, all L-instances of axiom (schema) T (A ⊃ A) and
axiom E (A ⊃ A) are valid, and the rule necessitation (A/A) is validity-
preserving. On the other hand, some L-instances of axiom K (((A ⊃ B) & A) ⊃
B) are not valid. In fact, let p and q be two atoms. Then ((p ⊃ q) & p) ⊃
q is false at the actual world of any TV-model 〈@, {w, @},TV, |=〉 where p and
q are both true at @, p has no truth-value at w and q is false at w. The logics
to be presented below, in particular Prior’s Q, diverge from system S5 essentially
in that each contains as a theorem a modified version of axiom K. (Here it should
be noted that while some L-instances of axiom K are not valid, every instance of
((A ⊃ (B & (A∨ ∼A))) & A) ⊃ (B & (A∨ ∼A)) is valid, even though B ≡
(B & (A∨ ∼A)) has all its instances valid.)2
3 System S5> The first system I shall envisage is S5>. Like the systems to be de-
fined in Section 4, it is formulated in a language richer than L .
3.1 S5> and its semantics The language for S5> is L>—that is, L with extra two-
place operator >. We define the TV-models for L> in the same way as the TV-models
for L , and the semantical clauses for the new operator are given by
[TV.>] TV(w, A > B) iff TV(w, A) and TV(w, B), and
[|= . >] w |= A > B iff TV(w, A) and TV(w, B) and for every v in W ,
if TV(v, A), then TV(v, B).
Validity is defined as before. For an arbitrary TV-model, we have
@ |= A > B iff for every w in W , if TV(w, A), then TV(w, B).
Thus, ‘A > B’ is to be read as ‘at every world where A has a truth-value, B has a truth-
value’, or as ‘for A to have a truth-value B must also have a truth-value’. ‘A > B’
can be seen as expressing the idea that there is some kind of relevance link between A
and B or between the “information” conveyed by A and by B. System S5> is defined
by the following axioms (schemas) and rules.
Classical axioms
Every PC-valid L-formula
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Axioms for >
A > B if each atom in B is in A
(A > B & B > C) ⊃ A > C
(A > B & A > C) ⊃ A > (B & C)
(A > B & A > C) ⊃ A > (B > C)
A > B ⊃ (A > B)
Modal axioms
(K>) (B > A & (A ⊃ B) & A) ⊃ B
(T) A ⊃ A
(E) A ⊃ A
Rules
(modus ponens) If  A and  A ⊃ B then  B
(necessitation) If  A then  A
3.2 Adequacy System S5> is adequate (i.e., sound + complete) with respect to
the semantics of TV-models. For soundness, it is more or less routine to show that
each axiom of S5> is valid and that necessitation is validity-preserving. The case for
modus ponens, though, is not standard: the rule does not preserve validity-in-a-model
(if it did, then axiom K would have all its instances valid). However, modus ponens
is validity-preserving, as the following argument shows. Let A, B be formulas, M =
〈@,W ,TV, |=〉 a TV-model, and w0 a world of M such that TV(w0, B). We want to
prove that if A and A ⊃ B are valid, then B is true at w0. Suppose that every atom in
A is in B. Then TV(w0, A) and TV(w0, A ⊃ B). So, if both A and A ⊃ B are valid,
they are true at w0 in M, and therefore so is B. Suppose now that some atom in A is
not in B. Consider the model N = 〈@,W ,TV′, |=′〉 defined by
1. TV′(w0, p) for every atom p in A not in B;
2. TV′(w, p) iff TV(w, p) for every atom p and every w in W such that w = w0
or p is not an atom in A not in B;
3. w0 |=′ p for every atom p in A not in B;
4. w |=′ p iff w |= p for every atom p and every w in W such that w = w0 or p
is not an atom in A not in B.
By the definition of N, for every atom p in B and for every w in W ,
(i) TV′(w, p) iff TV(w, p), and
(ii) w |=′ p iff w |= p.
From this fact, it follows that given any formula C whose atoms are all in B, for every
w in W ,w |=′ C if and only if w |= C (the proof is by induction on the complexity of
C). As a consequence, w0 |=′ B if and only if w0 |= B. Now by construction, both A
and A ⊃ B have a truth-value at w0 in N. So, if both A and A ⊃ B are valid, they both
are true at w0 in N and so, by the properties of truth-at-a-world, B is true at w0 in N.
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By the previous result then, B is true at w0 in M. Let us turn now to completeness.
Useful for what follows is the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1
1. If  (A ⊃ B) and  B > A, then  A ⊃ B.
2. A > B ⊃ A > C, provided all atoms in C are in B.
3. A > B ≡ A > C, provided B and C contain exactly the same atoms.
4. If B1, . . . , Bn are all the atoms in B, then  (A > B1 & · · · & A > Bn) ≡ A > B.
5. ∼ (A > B) ⊃  ∼ (A > B).
6. A ⊃ A.
7. (A & B) ⊃ (A & B).
Proof:
1. By axiom K>.
2. Let C1, . . . , Cn be all the atoms in C. If each is in B, then by the first axiom
for >, B > C1, . . . , B > Cn. So by the transitivity of >, A > B ⊃ A >
C1, . . . , A > B ⊃ A > Cn. So,  A > B ⊃ (A > C1 & · · · & A > Cn). As
a consequence of the third axiom for >, A > B ⊃ A > (C1 & · · · & Cn).
Now, each atom in C is in C1 & · · · & Cn, and so,  (C1 & · · · & Cn) > C.
By the transitivity of >, it follows that  A > B ⊃ A > C.
3. By the previous result.
4. Let B1, . . . , Bn be all the atoms in B. By Proposition 3.1(3),  A > B ≡
A > (B1 & · · · & Bn). Now we prove that  A > (B1 & · · · & Bn) ≡ (A >
B1 & · · · & A > Bn).
(i)  A > (B1 & · · · & Bn) ⊃ (A > B1 & · · · & A > Bn) follows from
Proposition 3.1(2).
(ii)  (A > B1 & · · · & A > Bn) ⊃ A > (B1 & · · · & Bn) follows from the
third axiom for >.
5. (a) By axiom T,  A ⊃ A.
(b) By axiom E,  A ⊃ A.
(c) By axiom E,  A ⊃ A.
By necessitation then,  (A ⊃ A). But  A > A. So by Proposi-
tion 3.1(1),  (A) ⊃ A. Points (a), (b), and (c) yield the result.
6. By classical logic and necessitation,  (A ⊃ (B ⊃ (A & B))). But  (B ⊃
(A & B)) > A and  A & B > B. We then have the result by Proposi-
tion 3.1(1).
7.  ∼(A > B) ⊃ ∼(A > B). By necessitation then,  (∼(A > B) ⊃ ∼
(A > B)). But by the fifth axiom for >, ∼ (A > B) > ∼(A > B). So
by Proposition 3.1(1),   ∼ (A > B) ⊃  ∼ (A > B). As a consequence,
 (A > B) ⊃ (A > B). The result follows from axioms E and T. 
Now for the completeness proof, let α be a nontheorem, and let @ be a maximal con-
sistent extension of {∼α} (use a Lindenbaum-type construction to prove the existence
of @). (I use a standard definition of consistency and inconsistency: a set of formulas
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 is inconsistent with respect to a given system if and only if there is a finite collection
A1, . . . , An of members of  such that ¬(A1 ∧ · · · ∧ An) is a theorem of that system;
and  is consistent with respect to a given system if and only if it is not inconsistent
with respect to that system.)
Proposition 3.2 Every theorem is in @, and for all formulas A and B, if A ∈ @
and A ⊃ B ∈ @ then B ∈ @.
This proposition will be used without explicit mention. Its proof is standard.
Let At be the set of all atoms, and let χ (constituency) be the function from the
set of all formulas to P (At ) such that χ(A) is the set of all atoms in A.
Let X be a nonempty subset of At . Then the closure of X, cX, is {p ∈ At | there
are p1, . . . , pn in X such that (p1 & · · · & pn) > p ∈ @}. Note that for X and Y any
subsets of At , X ⊆ cX, ccX = cX, and if X ⊆ Y then cX ⊆ cY . A nonempty subset
X of At will be said to be closed if and only if X = cX.
Proposition 3.3 For all formulas A and B, A > B ∈ @ if and only if χ(B) ⊆
cχ(A).
Proof: Let A and B be formulas, let χ(A) be {A1, . . . , An}, and let χ(B) be
{B1, . . . , Bm}.
(i) Let B j be in χ(B). Suppose A > B j ∈ @. Then since  (A1 & · · · & An) >
A, (A1 & · · · & Am > B j) ∈ @. So by definition of closure, B j ∈ cχ(A).
Conversely, suppose that B j ∈ cχ(A). By definition of closure, there are
α1, . . . , αk in χ(A) such that (α1 & · · · & αk) > B j ∈ @. But  A >
(α1 & · · · & αk). So, A > B j ∈ @. As a conclusion, A > B j ∈ @ iff B j ∈
cχ(A).
(ii) By Proposition 3.1(4),  A > B ≡ (A > B1 & · · · & A > Bm). So A > B ∈ @
if and only if A > B1 ∈ @ and · · · and A > Bm ∈ @. So by (i) above, A > B ∈
@ if and only if χ(B) ⊆ cχ(A). 
Where X is a closed set of atoms, let @[X] be the set of all formulas A such that
A ∈ @ and χ(A) ⊆ X. Note that @[X] is never empty (by definition, a closed set
is never empty, and if X contains, say p, then @[X] contains p∨ ∼p). Also note that
by axiom T, @[X] ⊆ @ for every closed set of atoms X. As a consequence, each
@[X] is consistent.
For every set of formulas S and every closed set of atoms X, say that S is X-
maximal in case (i) for every A in S, χ(A) ⊆ X and (ii) for every formula A such
that χ(A) ⊆ X, either A ∈ S or ∼A ∈ S. Clearly, every consistent set of formulas
satisfying (i), in particular every @[X], has some X-maximal consistent extension
(adapt the usual Lindenbaum-type construction).
Let W be {w|w is an X-maximal consistent extension of @[X] for some closed
set of atoms X}. Note that @ is in W , since At is closed and @ is trivially an At-
maximal extension of @[At]. For every w in W , there is only one closed set of atoms
X such that w is an X-maximal consistent extension of @[X]. Call it ‘D(w)’. In
the other direction, for every closed set of atoms X, there is some world w such that
D(w) = X. The reason is that @[X] is never empty.
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Now, where p is any atom, put ‘TV(w, p)’ for ‘p ∈ D(w)’, and ‘w |= p’ for
‘p ∈ w’. We have, for every atom p and every w in W ,
1. TV(@, p) (since D(@) = At), and
2. if w |= p then TV(w, p) (by maximality).
The 4-tuple 〈@,W ,TV, |=〉 is then a TV-model. The aim is now to prove that for
every formula A and every world w,w |= A if and only if A ∈ w, which will give us
completeness.
Proposition 3.4 Let w be in W . Then
1. every theorem A such that χ(A) ⊆ D(w) is in w, and for all formulas A and
B, if A ∈ w and (A ⊃ B) ∈ w then B ∈ w;
2. for all formulas A and B, if χ(A) ⊆ D(w) and A > B ∈ @ then χ(B) ⊆ D(w).
Proof: The proof for (1) is quite standard. For (2), let A, B be formulas. Suppose
that χ(A) ⊆ D(w). Then cχ(A) ⊆ cD(w), and since D(w) is closed, cχ(A) ⊆
D(w). Now suppose that A > B ∈ @. By Proposition 3.3, it follows that χ(B) ⊆
cχ(A). So, χ(B) ⊆ D(w). 
Proposition 3.5 For every w in W and for every formula A,A ∈ w if and only
if A ∈ @ and χ(A) ⊆ D(w).
Proof: Let A be a formula.
1. Suppose A ∈ @. Then by Proposition 3.1(6), A ∈ @. So, for every w in
W , if χ(A) ⊆ D(w) then A ∈ @[D(w)], and consequently A ∈ w.
2. SupposeA /∈ @. By maximality, ∼A ∈ @. So by axiom E,∼A ∈ @.
Consequently, for every w in W such that χ(A) ⊆ D(w),∼ A ∈ @[D(w)].
Thus, ∼ A ∈ w, and so by consistency, A /∈ w. 
Proposition 3.6 For every w in W and for all formulas A and B,
1. ∼A ∈ w if and only if χ(A) ⊆ D(w) and A /∈ w;
2. A & B ∈ w if and only if A ∈ w and B ∈ w;
3. A > B ∈ w if and only if χ(A)∪ χ(B) ⊆ D(w) and for every v in W such that
χ(A) ⊆ D(v), χ(B) ⊆ D(v).
Proof: Let A and B be formulas and let w be in W .
1. (i) Suppose ∼A ∈ w. Then χ(A) ⊆ D(w) and by consistency A /∈ w.
(ii) By maximality, if χ(A) ⊆ D(w) and A /∈ w then ∼A ∈ w.
2. (i) Suppose A & B ∈ w. Then χ(A & B) ⊆ D(w), and thus χ(A & B ⊃
A) and χ(A & B ⊃ B) are subsets of D(w). So since  A & B ⊃ A
and  A & B ⊃ B, by Proposition 3.4(1) A ∈ w and B ∈ w.
(ii) Suppose A ∈ w and B ∈ w. Then χ(A) ∪ χ(B) ⊆ D(w), and so,
χ(A ⊃ (B ⊃ (A & B))) ⊆ D(w). Thus since  A ⊃ (B ⊃ (A & B)),
by Proposition 3.4(1) A & B ∈ w.
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3. (i) Suppose A > B ∈ w. Then χ(A > B) ⊆ D(w). (a) A consequence
is that χ(A) ∪ χ(B) ⊆ D(w). (b) Another consequence is that χ(A >
B ⊃ (A > B)) ⊆ D(w). But since  A > B ⊃ (A > B), it follows
by Proposition 3.4(1) that (A > B) ∈ w. By Proposition 3.5, then
(A > B) ∈ @. So by axiom T, A > B ∈ @. We have then by Propo-
sition 3.4(2): for every v in W if χ(A) ⊆ D(v) then χ(B) ⊆ D(v).
(ii) Suppose A > B /∈ w and χ(A > B) ⊆ D(w). Then by maximal-
ity, ∼ (A > B) ∈ w. By Propositions 3.1(5) and 3.4(1), it follows that
∼ (A > B) ∈ w. So, by Proposition 3.5 and axiom T ∼(A > B) ∈ @,
and as a consequence, A > B /∈ @. By Proposition 3.3, then, χ(B) is
not a subset of cχ(A). Let v be any world with D(v) = cχ(A). We
have: χ(A) but not χ(B) is a subset of D(v).

Proposition 3.7 For every w in W and for every formula A,A ∈ w if and only
if χ(A) ⊆ D(w) and for every v in W such that χ(A) ⊆ D(v), A ∈ v.
Proof: Let A be a formula and let w be in W .
1. SupposeA ∈ w. A first consequence is that χ(A) ⊆ D(w). A second conse-
quence is that A ∈ @ by Proposition 3.5. From this it follows that for every
v in W such that χ(A) ⊆ D(v), A ∈ @[D(v)]. So, for every v in W such that
χ(A) ⊆ D(v), A ∈ v.
2. SupposeA /∈ w and χ(A) ⊆ D(w). By Proposition 3.5, thenA /∈ @. Now
let us prove that {∼A} ∪ @[cχ(A)] is consistent. Suppose it is not. Then one
can find B1, . . . , Bn in @[cχ(A)] such that  (B1 & · · · & Bn) ⊃ A. We have
then the following:
a. B1, . . . ,Bn are in @, and so by Proposition 3.1(7),(B1 & · · · & Bn)
is in @.
b. By necessitation, [(B1 & · · · & Bn) ⊃ A] is in @.
c. Since each Bi is in @[cχ(A)], each χ(Bi) is included in cχ(A). So,
by Proposition 3.3, each A > Bi is in @. Now by the third axiom for
>, (A > B1 & · · · & A > Bn) ⊃ A > (B1 & · · · & Bn). So, A >
(B1 & · · · & Bn) is in @.
These three points plus axiom K> entail that A is in @. So, since by hypothesis
A is not in @, we must conclude that {∼A} ∪ @[cχ(A)] is consistent. Now, let
v be a cχ(A)- maximal extension of {∼A} ∪ @[cχ(A)]. v is, of course, a cχ(A)-
maximal extension of @[cχ(A)], and so v is in W . Moreover, (a)χ(A) ⊆ D(v), and
(b) ∼A ∈ w, which by consistency entails that A /∈ w. 
Proposition 3.8 For every formula A and every world w, TV(w, A) if and only if
χ(A) ⊆ D(w).
Proof: Easy. 
Proposition 3.9 For every formula A and every world w,w |= A if and only if A ∈
w.
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Proof: By induction on the length of the formulas, using Propositions 3.6, 3.7, and
3.8. 
This ends the completeness proof.
4 System Q3 Prior was aware that the possibility that a proposition has no truth-
value at some possible world has to be taken into account in a correct treatment of
propositional modal logic. Accordingly, he developed a system, Q, and gave some
indications as to how to provide it with a world semantics (see Prior and Fine [1],
pp. 85–86). These indications show that, essentially, Prior agrees with the TV-
modeling of necessity presented in Section 2. In the present section, two results are
achieved. First, it is shown that system Q can be seen as a fragment of a mild exten-
sion of system S5>. Second, Q is given a TV-model semantics and proved adequate
with respect to it.
4.1 System Q Prior formulates system Q in a language with primitive operators
∼, & ,, and S—where S is a one-place operator intended to express necessary
statability (a proposition is necessarily statable if and only if it is statable (i.e., has
a truth-value) at every possible world).4 For the sake of uniformity, I will rather for-
mulate Q in language LS , namely, L augmented by operator S.
System Q can then be defined thus, with  standing for ∼  ∼ as before (see [1],
pp. 84–85).
Classical axioms
Every PC-valid formula
Axioms for S
S A ⊃ S p, for any atom p in A
(S p1 & · · · & S pn) ⊃ S A, where p1, . . . , pn are all the atoms in A
S A ⊃ S A
Modal axioms
(KS ) (S p1 & · · · & S pn & (A ⊃ B) & A) ⊃ B, where
p1, . . . , pn are all the atoms of A not in B
(T) A ⊃ A
(E) A ⊃ A
Rules
(modus ponens) If  A and  A ⊃ B then  B
(necessitation) If  A then  A
4.2 Q in S5>t Let L>t be L> augmented by a special atom, t. The TV-models for
L>t are like those for L>, except that we impose the following:
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[TV.t] TV(w, t) for any world w of any TV-model, and
[|= .t] w |= t for any world w of any TV-model.
Validity is defined as before and system S5>t is S5> plus t as an axiom and A > t as an
axiom schema. It should be clear that S5>t is adequate with respect to the semantics
of TV-models for L>t. (Soundness is straightforward. For completeness, the major
modification from the proof of Section 3 consists in requiring that every closed set of
atoms contain t.)
Now, put S A for t > A. As is readily shown, we have for an arbitrary TV-model
w |= S A iff for every w in W , TV(w, A).
That is, S A expresses the necessary statability of A. Moreover, where A is any for-
mula of L S, let A∗ be the result of replacing each occurrence of S in A by t >. Then
it is easy to show that for every formula A of L S, A is a theorem of Q if and only if
its translation A∗ in L>t is a theorem of S5>t.
4.3 Semantics for Q and adequacy We can do better: we can prove that system
Q is adequate with respect to the obvious TV-model semantics for language L S. The
TV-models for L S are defined in the same way as the TV-models for L , and the se-
mantic clauses for operator S are
1. TV(w, S A) iff TV(w, A), and
2. w |= S A iff for every w in W , TV(w, A).
As is easily checked, Q is sound with respect to the semantics of TV-models for LS .
For completeness, a slight adaptation of the completeness proof of Section 3 gives
the result. The proof for Q is even a bit simpler. Propositions 3.1(6) and 3.1(7) hold
in the present context, and we have the following proposition.
Proposition 4.1  S A ⊃ S A.
Proof:  S A ⊃ S A. By necessitation, then  (S A ⊃ S A). So by axiom KS ,
 S A ⊃ S A. As a consequence,   ∼ S A ⊃  ∼ S A. From axioms E and
T, it follows that   ∼ S A ⊃∼ S A. Hence the result. 
Let α be a nontheorem and let @ be a maximal consistent extension of {∼ α}. Propo-
sition 3.2 still holds.
Let At be now the set of all atoms of L S. Function χ is defined as before. Let
S(At ) be the set of all atoms p of L S such that S p is in @. Where X is a nonempty
subset of At , the closure of X, cX, is now X ∪ S(At ). As before, a subset X of At
will be said to be closed if and only if X = cX.
Where X is a closed set of atoms, @[X] and X-maximality are defined as in Sec-
tion 3. As before, each @[X] is consistent and has some X-maximal consistent ex-
tension.
We finally define the TV-model 〈@,W ,TV, |=〉 as in Section 3, and the aim is to
prove now that for every formula A and every world w,w |= A if and only if A ∈ w.
Proposition 4.2 Let A and B be formulas, with p1, . . . , pn all the atoms of B not
in A (we suppose there are such atoms). Then (S p1 & · · · & S pn) ∈ @ if and only
if χ(B) ⊆ cχ(A).
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Proof: Let A, B, p1, . . . , pn be as stated and let X be all the atoms of B in A.
(i) Suppose (S p1 & · · · & S pn) ∈ @. Then each S pi is in @ and so each pi is in
S(At ). Since χ(B) is X ∪ {p1, . . . , pn}, and X ⊆ χ(A), it follows that χ(B) ⊆
χ(A) ∪ S(At ). But χ(A) ∪ S(At ) is cχ(A).
(ii) Suppose χ(B) ⊆ cχ(A). Then each pi is in S(At ). So, each S pi is in @ and
therefore, (S p1 & · · · & S pn) ∈ @. 
Proposition 3.4(1) is easily proved and we have the following.
Proposition 4.3 Let A be a formula. Then if S A ∈ @, for every w in W , χ(A) ⊆
D(w).
Proof: Let A be a formula and suppose S A ∈ @. Then χ(A) ⊆ S(At). Now let w
be a world. Since D(w) is closed, S(At) ⊆ D(w). So, χ(A) ⊆ D(w). 
Propositions 3.5, 3.6(1), and 3.6(2) still hold, and we have the following proposition.
Proposition 4.4 For every w in W and for every formula A, S A ∈ w if and only
if for every v in W , χ(A) ⊆ D(v).
Proof: Let A be a formula, and let w be in W .
(i) Suppose S A ∈ w. Then by maximality, χ(S A) ⊆ D(w). A consequence is that
χ(S A ⊃S A) ⊆ D(w). But since by Proposition 4.1  S A ⊃S A, we have
by Proposition 3.4(1) thatS A ∈ w. By Proposition 3.5, thenS A ∈ @. So by
axiom T, S A ∈ @. We have then by Proposition 4.3: for every v in W , χ(A) ⊆
D(v).
(ii) Suppose S A /∈ w. We have to prove that there is a world v such that χ(A) is not
a subset of D(v). First case: χ(A) is not a subset of D(w). We directly have the
result. Second case: χ(A) is a subset of D(w). Then by maximality, ∼ S A ∈
w. Since ∼ S A ⊃∼ S A, we have by Proposition 3.4(1): ∼ S A ∈ w. So,
by Proposition 3.5 and axiom T, ∼ S A ∈ @, and as consequence, S A /∈ @. So,
there is an atom p in A such that p /∈ S(At ). Let v be any world with p /∈ D(v).
We have: χ(A) is not a subset of D(v). 
Proposition 3.7 also holds. The first half of the proof is the same as in Section 3.
For the second half, minor modifications have to be made. Suppose that A /∈ w
and χ(A) ⊆ D(w). By Proposition 3.5, then A /∈ @. Now let us prove that
{∼A} ∪ @[cχ(A)] is consistent. Suppose it is not. Then one can find B1, . . . , Bn
in @[cχ(A)] such that  (B1 & · · · & Bn) ⊃ A. We have then the following:
1. B1, . . . ,Bn are in @, and so by Proposition 3.1(7), (B1 & · · · & Bn) is
in @.
2. By necessitation, [(B1 & · · · & Bn) ⊃ A] is in @.
3. Since each Bi is in @[cχ(A)], each χ(Bi) is included in cχ(A). So,
χ(B1 & · · · & Bn) ⊆ cχ(A). Let p1, . . . , pm be the atoms of B1 & · · · & Bn
not in A (if there are such atoms). By Proposition 4.2, then (Sp1 & · · · & Spm)
∈ @.
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These three points plus axiom KS entail thatA is in @. So, since by hypothesisA
is not in @, we must conclude that {∼A} ∪ @[cχ(A)] is consistent. The rest of the
proof is as in Section 3.
Proposition 3.8 still holds. We conclude that for every formula A and every
world w,w |= A if and only if A ∈ w, as expected.
5 A simpler system All the systems considered so far are formulated in a language
richer than the purely modal language L . But consider system S5−, whose rules are
modus ponens and necessitation and whose axiom schemas are all PC-tautologies, T,
E, and
(K−) (A ⊃ B) & A) ⊃ B, where all the atoms of A are in B.5
Clearly, K− is a theorem of Q and S5> (and of S5>t). So, S5− is sound with respect to
the class of all TV-models for L . Moreover, completeness is easily proved (adapt the
completeness proof for S5> by defining the closure of a nonempty set as that very set;
every proposition in the completeness proof for S5> which does not concern operator
> is provable as it stands).
6 Re´sume´ Systems S5>, S5>t, Q, and S5− are all both sound and complete with
respect to their respective semantics. S5− ⊂ S5> ⊂ S5>t, S5− ⊂ Q, and for every
formula A in LS , A is a theorem of Q if and only if its translation A∗ in L>t is a
theorem of S5>t.
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NOTES
1. Following a standard assumption, I take a statement to be false at a world if and only if
its negation is true at that world. I shall also suppose that no proposition can be both true
and false at a world.
2. Before turning to systematic concerns, let me mention that Segerberg [2] proves com-
pleteness for modal systems (Q included), whose semantics is similar to the semantics
of TV-models. The reader is invited to glance at this paper for a full comparison. Two
big differences between Segerberg’s systems/semantics and mine are: (1) his semantical
clauses do not all respect the principle of contamination: formulas of type TA are true at
worlds where A has no truth-value; (2) his systems are closed under a restricted version
of modus ponens, not under full modus ponens.
3. In a previous version of the present paper, no section was devoted to system Q. It was a
nice surprise for me to discover Prior’s ideas on necessity once I obtained the previous
results about S5> and its semantics.
4. Let a constituent of a proposition (in the sense introduced in Section 1) be any object
rigidly denoted by some expression in that proposition. For Prior, a proposition is stat-
able at a world if and only if either it has no constituent, or all its constituents exist in
that world. And accordingly, a proposition is necessarily statable if and only if either
it has no constituent, or all its constituents exist necessarily (see [1], pp. 93–94). Fol-
lowing Prior’s account of statability, the operator > introduced in Section 2 should be
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considered as expressing a form of existential dependence. For in case propositions A
and B both have some constituents, we should then read A > B as something like ‘for
the constituents of A to exist, those of B must exist’, or ‘the constituents of A cannot
exist unless the constituents of B exist’.
5. I am indebted to an anonymous referee of the Journal for suggesting that I examine sys-
tem S5−.
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